THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO

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• What is true of the chattel slaves and servile artisans of ancient
  Greece and Rome is essentially true of the serfs in the agrarian
  economies of feudal Europe, and of the wage slaves who formed
  the industrial proletariat in the middle of the nineteenth century. At
  no time in the past were the working masses economically free
  men. Nor, until the power of organized labor gave them some
  measure of the economic independence which property in capital
  always bestowed on the leisure class, were they admitted to suffrage
  and the political freedom of a voice in their own government.
  Before the rise of industrial production and organized labor,
  the members of the ruling class were for the most part identical
  with the members of the leisure class. This is true of colonial
  America and of the first decades of our republic as well as of the
  republics of ancient Greece and Rome. The men of property were
  economically free men. Because they had through property a freedom
  which they wished to protect, they strove to safeguard it with
  the rights and privileges of political status and power. Their economic
  freedom was the basis of their claim to political liberty.
  But their economic freedom was also the basis of their opportunity
  to lead a human as opposed to a subhuman life. In all the
  pre-industrial societies of the past, this opportunity was open only
  to those who could engage in the liberal activities of leisure because
  they obtained all they needed for subsistence and comfort
  from income-bearing property other than their own labor power.
  To understand this, let us contrast the condition of the slave
  with that of the economically free man. We shall see that there are
  three elements in economic freedom, the most significant of
  which is freedom from toil or freedom for leisure. This is indispensable
  to leading a free, as opposed to a servile, life. The slave
  not only lacked such freedom, but also the economic independence
  and security without which political liberty cannot be effectively
  employed or enjoyed.
  In the following threefold contrast between the conditions of
  economic slavery and freedom, the word "slave" is used in the
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  broadest sense to cover not only men who belong to other men as
  their private chattels, but also all who are forced by lack of property
  to lead servile or subhuman lives.
  1. The slave was a man who worked for the good or profit of another
  man, and worked as an instrument or tool of that other
  man as well as in his interests. He was exploited in the sense
  that the fruits of his labor were alienated from his good to that
  of another. In contrast, the economically free man engaged in
  no activity in which he served as the instrument of another
  man, and did nothing which served any good except his own or
  the common good of his society.
  2. The slave was a man who was dependent for his subsistence on
  the arbitrary will of another man, his master. In this condition,
  he was always threatened with economic destitution--
  starvation or worse. He had no economic security or freedom
  from want. In contrast, the master as an owner of property was
  an economically independent man. This is not to say that any
  man is ever wholly secure from misfortune. Since wealth is
  among the goods of fortune, it is always subject to accidents.
  But allowing for accidents, the economically free man is one
  who has enough property to be free from want without greater
  dependence on other men than they have upon him, and to be
  relatively secure against the threat of destitution.
  3. The slave was a man who spent most of his time and energy in
  toil. Toil for him began in childhood and ended with his death,
  usually an early one; and it occupied almost all of his waking life,
  seven days a week. What time was left he needed for sleep and
  other basic biological functions in order to keep alive. In contrast,
  the man who obtained all the subsistence he needed, or much
  more than that, from the use of his property, including the labor of
  his slaves, had economic freedom in the most important sense of
  this term: freedom from toil. Only when such freedom is added to
  freedom from want, insecurity, or destitution--and to freedom
  from exploitation by another and from dependence on the arbi27
  trary will of another--do we approach the ideal of liberty in the
  economic sphere of human life.
  These three contrasts between the condition of masters and the
  condition of slaves, as men who are and are not economically free,
  can be summarized by the antithesis Aristotle draws between the
  servile and the free life. Some men, according to Aristotle, merely
  subsist; others are able, beyond subsistence, to live well, i.e., to engage
  in leisure activities.2 The servile life consists in nothing but toil
  in order to subsist. Men who have the misfortune of being chattels
  or of being propertyless are forced to lead a servile life--a life of
  toil, insecurity, and dependence.
  Of course, some men who are fortunate enough to have sufficient
  property to live well actually degrade themselves to the level
  of the servile life by using all their time and energy in accumulating
  wealth and even by engaging in toil to do so. While men without
  property cannot live well, not all men with property do live well,
  but only those who, understanding the difference between labor
  and leisure, direct their activities to the goals of the free life.3
  2 Aristotle describes the occupation of virtuous men of property in the following
  manner: "Those who are in a position which places them above toil have stewards
  who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy
  and politics" (Politics, Book 1, Ch. 7, 1225b35-38). In this passage, the
  words "philosophy" and "politics" are shorthand for all the activities of leisure-
  engagement in the liberal arts and sciences and occupation with the institutions
  and processes of society.
  3 Distinguishing between two kinds of wealth getting, Aristotle says that "accumulation
  is the end in the one case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence
  some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of household
  management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase
  their money, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in
  men," he declares, "is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living
  well" (Politics, Book 1, Ch. 9, 1257b35-1258a2).
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  LABOR, LEISURE AND FREEDOM
  The distinction between labor and leisure is generally misunderstood
  in twentieth-century America. Leisure is misconceived as
  idleness, vacationing (which involves "vacancy"), play, recreation,
  relaxation, diversion, amusement and so on. If leisure were that, it
  would never have been regarded by anyone except a child or a
  childish adult as something morally better than socially useful
  work.
  The misconception of leisure arises from the fact that it involves
  free time--time that is free from the biological necessity of
  sleep, and of labor to obtain the means of subsistence. Such time
  can, of course, be filled in various ways: with amusements and diversions
  of all sorts, or with the intrinsically virtuous activities by
  which men pursue happiness and serve the common good of their
  society. Leisure, properly conceived as the main content of a free,
  as opposed to a servile, life, consists in activities which are neither
  toil nor play, but are rather the expressions of moral and intellectual
  virtue--the things a good man does because they are intrinsically
  good for him and for his society, making him better as a man
  and advancing the civilization in which he lives.
  In all the pre-industrial societies of the past, when only a few
  were exempt from grinding toil, the activities of leisure were as
  sharply distinguished from indulgence in amusements or recreations
  as they were from the drudgery of toil. Husbandmen, craftsmen,
  and laborers of all sorts provided society with its means of
  subsistence and its material comforts. They had little or no time
  free for leisure or for play. Ample free time belonged only to those
  who obtained their subsistence from the property they owned and
  the labor of others. If these men had frittered away their free time
  in frivolity and play, the civilization to which we are the heirs
  would never have been produced; for civilization, as opposed to
  subsistence, is produced by those who have free time and use it
  creatively--to develop the liberal arts and sciences and all the institutions
  of the state and of religion.
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  Play, like sleep, washes away the fatigues and tensions that result
  from the serious occupations of life, all the forms of labor
  which produce the goods of subsistence and all the leisure activities
  which produce the goods of civilization. Play and sleep, as Aristotle
  pointed out, are for the sake of these serious and socially useful
  occupations. Since the activities of leisure can be as exacting and
  tiring as the activities of toil, some form of relaxation, whether
  sleep or play or both, is required by those who work productively.4
  As play is for the sake of work, so subsistence work is for the
  sake of leisure activity. To confuse leisure either with idleness or
  amusement is to invert the order of goods which gave moral significance
  to the class divisions in all the pre-industrial societies of
  the past. Those among our ancestors who were men of virtue as
  well as men of property would find it difficult to understand how
  any self-respecting man could regard indulgence in amusements as
  the goal of life. They looked upon the labor of slaves and artisans
  as the means which provided them with the opportunity to engage
  in leisure, not in play. To expect the masses to labor from dawn to
  dusk and throughout life so that a small class of men could waste
  their free time in idleness, amusement, or sport would express, in
  their view, a degree of childishness or immorality that could be
  found only in the most depraved or vicious members of their
  class.5
  4 See Aristotle's Politics, Book VII, Chs. 9, 14 and 15; Book VIII, Ch. 3.
  5 When, in 1825, the journeymen carpenters of Boston struck for higher wages
  and shorter hours, the master carpenters, their employers, replied that "the
  measures proposed [were] calculated to exert a very unhappy influence on our
  apprentices--by seducing them from that course of industry and economy of
  time to which we are anxious to inure them." They also maintained "that it will
  expose the journeymen themselves to many temptations and improvident practices
  from which they are happily secure," adding "that we consider idleness as
  the most deadly bane to useful and honorable living." They were supported in
  this by the "gentlemen engaged in building," who did not regard their own free
  time as an occasion for vice. Two years later when a strike of journeyman carpenters
  in Philadelphia led to a city-wide federation of labor unions, the Preamble
  of the Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations declared that they were
  30
  Since the confusion of leisure with idleness or amusement is
  rampant in our industrial society, when, for the first time in history,
  it has become possible for all men to have enough free time to engage
  in leisure, it may be difficult for our contemporaries to understand
  that labor and leisure are the two main forms of human work,
  and that the first is for the sake of the second. Unless they do understand
  this, however, they will not see the ultimate moral significance
  of the capitalist revolution. It may increase human freedom
  and strengthen the institutions of a free society, but freedom itself
  is only a means. Freedom can be squandered and perverted as well
  as put to good use.
  Only if freedom from labor becomes freedom for leisure will
  the capitalist revolution produce a better civilization than any so far
  achieved, and one in the production of which all men will participate.
  Only if men thus use their opportunity for leisure will the
  capitalist revolution result in an improvement of human life itself,
  and not merely in its external conditions or institutions. As labor is
  for the sake of leisure, so freedom and justice for all are the institutional
  means whereby the good life that was enjoyed by the few
  alone in the pre-industrial aristocracies of the past will be open to
  all men in the capitalistic democracies of the future.6
  placed "in a situation of such unceasing exertion and servility as must necessarily,
  in time, render the benefits of our liberal institutions to us inaccessible and
  useless." They looked to the progressive shortening of the working day as the
  means whereby all the useful members of the community would gradually come
  to possess "a due and full proportion of that invaluable promoter of happiness,
  leisure" (reprinted in The People Shall Judge, Chicago, 1953: Vol. 1, pp. 580-583).
  6 Sleep, play, toil, and leisure represent diverse goods in human life. But they do
  not have the same moral value. As contrasted with idleness, indolence, or the
  wanton waste of human time and energy, sleep and play contribute to human
  well-being. But they contribute less than productive toil and leisure. All the
  goods that contribute positively to human well-being must be sought in the pursuit
  of happiness, but they must be sought in the right order and proportion. A
  man defeats himself in the pursuit of happiness if he places the goods of the
  body above the goods of the soul, or if he plays so much in his free time that he
  has little time left for leisure.
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  The current misuse of the word "leisure" requires us to find
  other words for expressing the basic distinction which is so essential
  to the understanding of the capitalist revolution. We may not
  always be able to avoid using that word, but at least we can try to
  correct misunderstanding by the employment of other words or
  phrases for expressing its meaning.
  It may be helpful to observe that where Aristotle drew a sharp
  line between labor and leisure, Adam Smith made the same distinction
  in human activities by drawing an equally sharp line between
  what he called "productive labor" and "non-productive labor." His
  use of the word "labor" shows that he had socially useful work in
  mind in both cases, and not idleness or play. By "non-productive
  labor," he meant the activities of the clergy, statesmen, philosophers,
  scientists, artists, teachers, physicians and lawyers. He called
  these activities "labor" because, like the forms of work that are
  productive of wealth, they are not playful but serious, and serve a
  socially useful purpose. And he called such labor "non-productive"
  because, unlike other forms of work, the socially useful purpose
  they serve is not the production of wealth or the goods of bodily
  subsistence, but the production of civilization, or the goods of the
  human spirit.
  We think it is better to use the term "work" for both forms of
  activity. We shall speak of "subsistence work" when we mean the
  activities that are productive of wealth (i.e., the necessities, comforts
  and conveniences of life); and we shall speak of "liberal
  work" or "leisure work" when we mean the activities that are productive
  of the goods of civilization (i.e., the liberal arts and sciences,
  the institutions of the state and of religion).
  Whenever we revert to the use of the words "labor" and "leisure"
  without qualification, we hope it will be understood that labor
  is identical with subsistence work and leisure with liberal
  work. The fact that leisure is equated with one of the two principal
  forms of human work should help to prevent anyone from confusing
  it with play or idleness. The fact that the goods which it
  produces are so different from the goods produced by subsistence
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  work should also help to preserve the distinction between labor
  and leisure, which is so necessary for all that follows.
  THE FORM AND CHARACTER OF HUMAN WORK
  So far we have distinguished two main forms of human work
  solely by reference to what they produce, or the ends they serve:
  on the one hand, the goods of the body, the biological goods of
  subsistence, the necessities, comforts and conveniences of life; on
  the other hand, the goods of the soul, the goods of civilization or
  of the human spirit, such things as the arts and sciences, the institutions
  of the state and of religion.
  Work can be differentiated by reference to its human quality as
  well as by reference to its end or purpose.
  Certain forms of work are mechanical in quality. They involve
  repetitive, routine operations which call for little or no creative intelligence
  upon the part of the worker. They also involve bodily
  exertion, or at least some manual dexterity; but it is the mechanical
  character of the task to be performed, not the physical character of
  the performance, which makes such work stultifying.
  The materials on which the worker operates, but not his own
  nature, are improved by his efforts. After he has acquired the
  minimum skill required for doing it, he learns nothing more. He
  may increase the store of useful goods in the world, but he does
  not himself grow in stature as a man.
  The Greek word banausia expressed the degrading quality of
  the mechanical work done by slaves--the dullness of the repetitive
  which is most intense in the kind of toil we call "drudgery."
  Because of its repetitiveness, the person who is engaged in it does
  not grow mentally, morally, or spiritually. On the contrary, drudgery
  stunts growth.
  Because it is intrinsically unrewarding, such work must be extrinsically
  compensated. It is done under compulsion--the need
  for subsistence. Anyone who could secure his subsistence from
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  other sources would try to avoid it, or do as little of it as possible.
  Hence such work is normally done for extrinsic compensation of
  some sort, whether in the shape of immediately consumable goods,
  or wages, or the meager subsistence meted out to a slave.
  At the opposite extreme from work that is mechanical in quality
  as well as done to produce and obtain subsistence, there is work
  that is creative in quality as well as liberal in the end at which it
  aims. All leisure activities constitute work of this sort. The creative
  aspect of such work is signified by the Greek word for leisure,
  which was scholé. Like our English word "school," it connotes
  learning--mental, moral, or spiritual growth.
  Such work is, therefore, intrinsically rewarding. It is something
  which every man should, and any virtuous man would, do for its own
  sake. If he has sufficient property to secure for himself and his
  family a sufficiency of the means of subsistence, the virtuous man
  gladly engages in liberal work without extrinsic compensation. Like
  virtue itself, such work is its own reward.
  We have just seen that the forms of human work can be differentiated
  by reference to their human quality, or the effect they have
  on the worker, as well as differentiated by reference to the goods
  they produce for society as a whole. We must now observe that
  these distinctions can be compounded.
  At one extreme in the scale of human work, certain socially
  useful activities combine having the production of wealth as their
  aim with being mechanical in quality. At the opposite extreme are
  the highest activities of leisure, which combine being creative in
  quality with having as their aim the production of the goods of
  civilization and of the human spirit. In between these extremes,
  there are the mixed forms of work: on the one hand, subsistence
  work which, while it aims at the production of wealth, is creative
  rather than mechanical in quality; on the other hand, work which,
  while mechanical in quality, nevertheless serves a purpose which is
  identical with the aim of liberal work.
  This fourfold division of the kinds of work is of critical significance
  when we come subsequently to consider the variety of tasks
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  to be performed in our modern industrial society. For the present,
  we shall use it in order to call attention to a widely prevalent misunderstanding
  about the dignity of human work.
  In the ancient world--in fact, in all the pre-industrial societies
  of the past--no one made the mistake of supposing that equal dignity
  attaches to all human activity. Human dignity was thought to
  reside primarily in those activities which are specifically or characteristically
  human, i.e., activities which have no counterpart whatsoever
  in the life of brute animals or in the operations of machines.
  Brutes as well as men struggle for subsistence. Though the
  subsistence activities of brutes are largely instinctive, while those of
  men usually involve some employment of intelligence or reason,
  the goal or end of such activities is the same in both cases. Human
  life has its distinctive worth or dignity only insofar as it rises above
  biological activities and involves activities which are not performed
  by brutes, or at least not performed in the same way.
  Man's special dignity lies in goods which no other animal
  shares with him at all, as other animals share with him the goods of
  food, shelter, and even those of sleep and play. Hence man has no
  special dignity as a producer of subsistence or wealth, but only as a
  user of wealth for the sake of specifically liberal activities productive
  of the goods of the spirit and of civilization.
  It follows, therefore, that the only dignity there is in working to
  produce subsistence comes from such creative use of intelligence
  or reason as may be involved in the performance of tasks that are
  nonmechanical in quality. Even so, they have less dignity than
  nonmechanical or creative work which is liberal in its aim. Work
  which is not only mechanical in quality but also has the production
  of subsistence as its only aim is lowest in the scale. Such dignity as
  attaches to any work productive of subsistence, whether mechanical
  or creative, derives from the fact that the production of wealth,
  rightly understood, serves to support the leisure activities that constitute
  the dignity of human life.
  It may be thought that St. Paul preaches a Christian message to
  the contrary when he says of those who do not work, neither shall
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  they eat. But it should be remembered, in the first place, that the
  toil by which man eats in the sweat of his face is a punishment for
  sin, not an honor or a blessing. And, in the second place, it should
  be observed that the word St. Paul uses, in making this remark,
  means any form of socially useful activity, and not labor in the narrow
  sense of toil for the sake of subsistence .7 What he is saying, in
  short, is that all men are under a moral obligation not just to work
  for a living, but to work in order to deserve a living. In the Christian
  sense, those who, having the means of subsistence, do not try
  to live well by doing liberal work enjoy a living they do not deserve.
  THE IMAGE OF AN ECONOMICALLY FREE SOCIETY
  So far we have seen how the life of a master in a slave society contains
  all the elements of economic freedom, and therewith the opportunities
  for leading a good life, which he will use well only if he
  is a man of virtue.
  The possession of sufficient productive capital property enables
  a man to be economically free, but by itself it cannot make
  him lead a free and liberal life rather than a life devoted to the production
  or consumption of subsistence. He may engage in toil or
  trade even if he does not have to, because he does not have the
  virtue to rise above it; or, worse than that, he may squander his
  time and energies in indolence, or in pastimes which, no matter